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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES E. BERNARD, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 
16895 
JOHN W. ATTEBURY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action under the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act seeking support for her two minor children 
pursuant to a 1976 Wyoming divorce decree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
1. That defendant pay to plaintiff the sum of $150 per 
month for the support of John Joseph Attebury the said support to 
commence on June 1, 1979. 
2. That defendant pay to plaintiff the sum of $150 per month 
for the support of John David Attebury commencing August 1, 1979 through 
November 1, 1979 when the said minor child turns eighteen (18) years 
of age for a total amount due of $600. 
3. That defendant owes to plaintiff the sum of $2,000 as 
arrearages for the two (2) minor children of the parties computed as 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
follows: $250 per month for each of the minor children of the partie 
for the months of February through May of 1979 for a total of $2,000 
arrearages. The Court entering this Order waived support money for 
John David Attebury for the months of June and July of 1979 because 
of his employment during those months. 
4. .That the defense of res judicata, specifically that 
the Order of May 31, 19 79 was res judicata as to the arrearages award: 
in the Judgment and Order of September 5, 1979, be and the same is 
hereby determined to be not established, and that the Motion of 
defendant objecting to the Order of September 5, 1979 be and the 
same is hereby overruled. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
L That all support ordered for John David Attebury be 
reviewed. 
2. That the support order for John David Attebury and Jahr 
Joseph Attebury be modified to the extent that their stepfather is 
obligated to provide support and in fact, did provide support. 
3. That the judgment for arrearages be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff divorced defendant on September 7, 1976, in the 
.. 
..... 
District Court for Sweetwater County, State of Wyoming, and was awar 
ed custody of the two minor children of the parties, to-wit: John ·~ 
-2-
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David Attebury, d/o/b 11-30-61 and John Joseph Attebury, d/o/b 
8-15-64 (R. 7) . Defendant was not represented by counsel and a 
support order for the said minor children in the sum of $500.00 per 
month was entered (R. 7). 
John David Attebury, hereinafter called John David, dropped 
out of school in the fall of 1976 (T. 94). In the fall of 1977 
John David went to Idaho Falls, Idaho and secured employment as a 
prep man for Ace Hansen Chevrolet (T. 70). In March of 1978, John 
David came to Salt Lake City where he resided with defendant through 
December 8, 1978 (T. 70). In October of 1977 John Joseph Attebury, 
hereinafter called John Joseph, came to Salt Lake City to reside with 
defendant (T. 69~77). John Joseph lived with and was supported by 
defendant and attended school through December 8, 1978 (T. 69). John 
David would not attend school in Salt Lake City and went to work as a 
laborer for the BLM at the minimum wage (T. 70). Defendant purchased 
an El Camino and automobile insurance for John David and advanced monies 
to him which were repaid in part from John David's earnings at the BLM 
(T. 71). On November 29, 1978, plaintiff came to Salt Lake City, and 
established contact with John David and John Joseph (T. 78). On Decembe. 
7, 1978, plaintiff resumed custody of John David and John Joseph and 
immediately applied for pub~ic assistance from the State of Utah for 
them (T. 79). Plaintiff, in fact, received public assistance from the 
State of Utah for John David and John Jospeh for the month of December, 
1978 and January, 1979 (T. 80). 
-- -----..-............ ~ ---~·------------'= -~--------...... ~~~~~~~------~~ 
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On December 9, 1978, John David and John Joseph were requir 
to return to Green River, Wyoming by themselves with plaintiff return~: 
to Green River on January 1, 1979 (T. 80). Both boys have lived con- ;;· 
tinuously with plaintiff in Green River, Wyoming from January l, 1979::: 
to the date of the hearing (T. 81). From December 9, 1978 to January 
1979, John David and John Joseph resided temporarily with friends in ::: 
Green River, Wyoming, until plaintiff was able to return (T. 79, 80, ;· 
On January 22, 1979, plaintiff married Willy Bernard in the~ 
Swee_twater County Clerk's Office (T. 81, 82). Mr. Bernard purchased.: 
a mobile home.for plaintiff and the two boys (T. 82) and was employed 
,J.. 
as a "railroader" (T. 86). Plaintiff provided support for John Davia:.: 
... 
and John Joseph (T. 82; 86) • Mr. Bernard provided support for John ··· 
David and John Jos~ph (T. 82; 86) and in fact provided John David witl 
a 1966 Dodge Pickup truck for his personal use (T. 92). 
After John David left Salt Lake City on December 9, 1978 
to take up residence in Green River, Wyoming, he first worked at 
~c 
Covey's Little America from December 15, 1978 to January 17, 1979 
(T. 83) where he earned $3.25 per hour (T. 88). Sometime between 
January 1979 and May, 1979, John David worked for Bill Robins install 
ing the skirting at the bottom of mobile homes for 25¢ a foot (T. 83, 
88, 89) • John David kept his own earnings during this period of time 
but on occasion bought groceries for plaintiff (T. 84) and helped to 
buy his brother's glasses (T. 85). 
In May of 1979, Mr. Bernard, who was a railroad foreman, 
secured employment for John David working on the railroad working on 
derailments (T. 83; 91). John David worked for 'a day or so at a time' 
'• 
~ 
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and made $100 on one such occasion (T. 91). Between February and 
May of 1979 John David also worked for a month for the Oil Repair 
Service at Reliance, Wyoming for between $3 and $5 per hour (T. 96, 96). 
In June of 1979 John David went to work as a truck driver 
for Jackman Refuse at a salary of $800 per month (T. 84; 89} and could 
have earned as much as $1,600 (T. 90) although he could not remember 
exactly how long he worked for Jackman Refuse (T. 91) even though 
it was but a few weeks before the hearing (T. 90). 
John David next worked for the Burns Detective Agency in 
August of 1979 (T. 84) earning $4#77 per hour and apparently worked 
for them up until a few days before the hearing (T. 90). 
During all of these employments John David kept his own 
salary and used it for his own expenses and personal debts (T. 84); 
did not pay rent (T. 91); on occasion bought groceries for plaintiff 
(T. 84; 92) and helped buy his brother's glasses (T. 85). He was 
engaged to be married but not until he turned 18 and could "get a job" 
(T. 91). 
On March 21, 1979, plaintiff filed a petition for support 
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act claiming 
support from December 1, 1978. An Order to Show Cause was issued and 
service was accepted by defendant's attorney pursuant to agreement 
with plaintiff's attorney (R. 9, 10). 
At this point an agreement was entered into by and between 
Deputy County Attorney Marcus Theodore, Dennis Kroll and the attorney 
-5-
- ~-- -----------~ ------------
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for defendant, stipulating for a reduction in the support money from 
$500 to $300 per month with $150 being paid to John Joseph effective 
immediately but with certain restrictions with reference to the pay-
ment to John David Attebury (T. 73). This agreement was supposed to 
have been reduced to writing in the order of May 30, 1979 (R. 11, 12). 
A stipulation correcting the order to what it should have been was pre 
pared by defendant's counsel and executed by counsel on July 2, 1979 
(R. 19) A corrected order effective as of May 30, 1979 was signed 
by Judge Dee on August 22, 1979, but to, correct the erroneous order 
entered on June 8, 1979. 
The issue of res judicata was raised at this time and was 
specifically reserved by the court in the minute entry (R. 16) , and 
at (T. 56-59) and in fact on the judgment and order entered on 
August 22, 1979 (R. 18). 
On September 5, 1979, a judgment and order was entered 
reflecting the decision of the court as a result of the hearing on 
August 22, 1979 (R. 20). Objection was taken to this judgment and 
order by defendant (R. 22) and on November 29, 1979, a new petition 
and order to show cause was issued against defendant (R. 24). A 
hearing was set for January 16, 1980 and on this date a hearing was 
held ~n the question of res judicata (T. 44-53) -and resulted in the 
consolidated order of January 16, 1980 signed by Judge Uno (R. 40, 41): 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING 
SUPPORT FOR JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY UNDER THE UNIFORM 
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT. 
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, here-
after URESA, is a statute whose purpose is to provide a mechanism 
to enforce a duty of support in a foreign jurisdiction by someone 
who has a right to support. If a legal duty is found, the amount of 
support ordered under URESA by the trial court is discretionary. The 
trial court should judge the amount to be ordered independently based 
upon the ability of the obliger to pay and the need of the obligee 
to receive support. 
The Wyoming URESA gives jurisdiction to decide the issue 
of support to the Utah courts. The Wyoming statute states: 
"Duties of support applicable under this Act 
are those imposed or impossible under the laws 
of any state where the obliger was present for 
the period during which support is sought. The 
obliger is presumed to have been present in the 
responding state during the period for which 
support is sought until otherwise shown." 
Wyoming Statute 20-111 1957 as Amended, 1973 
Cum. Supplement. 
In the instant case, the obliger, herein the defendant, 
has been present in Utah during the period in which support is being 
sought. Utah, as the responding state, must therefore apply its laws. 
In Thompson v. Kite, 214 Kansas 700, 522 P.2d 327 (1974), the 
Supreme Court of Kansas stated: 
-7-
------.-.--------.... -~--------------~ 
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care of both himself and his brother. There doesn't seem to be any 
reason not to assume that he would be able to continue to work and 
support himself until he reaches 18. If anyone is able to take care 
of oneself, he is. John David Attebury :..s also receiving support 
from his stepfather (who has a duty to provide it under Utah law) and 
mother, thus showing the lack of need of any support money. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM RECOVERING CHILD SUPPORT 
BECAUSE SUCH SUPPORT WAS ALREADY BEING PROVIDED Ai.~D 
SHE IS NOT REQUESTING REIMBURSEV.lENT 
The basic right of a child to support is unquestioned. In 
the instant case, however, John David Attebury was being fully support-,. 
ed by his mother, his stepfather, and himself. 
The contention of plaintiff that John David Attebury is 
also entitled to be supported by defendant for the same period is 
contrary to the case of Wasescha v. Wasescha, Utah 548 P.2d 895 {1976). 
In that case the court held that where the children were supported by 
the mother and her second husband and where she was not seeking re-
imbursement but rather was planning to place all the sums in trust 
for the future of the children, that the husband was not obligated to 
provide double support. The court said: 
"There is no prayer for reimbursement for past 
support under such conditions, but there seems 
to be an admission that the children's right to 
support amply was supplied by someone, ~hich would 
eliminate their claim for support, or, if you please, 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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double support, and which admission would seem to 
be an abandonment of a parent's claim for reimburse-
ment, and certainly an estoppel to assent an anti-
ethical claim for past child support, - unless a 
case were instituted refutedly to assert the child-
ren's right to support, which, of course, is theirs, 
but seems not to be the case extant here." 
Similarly in the instant case there is no prayer for reim-
bursement and John David Attebury was clearly, under the testimony of 
his mother, being supported by his mother, stepfather and to a large 
extent, by himself. Defendant should not also be required to support 
John David Attebury for that same period of time and the order re-
quiring him to do so is an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court. In Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429 P.2d 35, 36 (1967), 
this court stated: 
"When the child becomes self-supporting or ceases 
to be a minor the court will make such an order 
regarding the distribution of the property as 
shall be reasonable and proper." 
POINT III 
JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY IS AN EMANCIPATED CHILD Al.~D IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT 
There are no guides under Utah law regarding the determina-
tion of whether a child is emancipated. The only Utah case dealing 
with emancipation in any way is Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 5 P.2d 
570 (1931) which is not applicable to the case at hand. 
In Sparks, the child claimed that wages earned had been 
given to his aunt, with whom he was residing, for purposes of invest-
ment by her for him. This court held that the aunt standing in loco 
parents to the child_and was entitled to the wages and earnings of 
stated that merely reaching the age of 
-11-
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majority did not ipso facto terminate the relationship and emancipate 
the child. 
The Sparks case talks about emancipation and that it does 
not occur automatically, but does not give any quidline as to when 
it does occur or what factors are to be considered in determining 
whether or not there has been an emancipation. Also in Sparks, the 
plaintiff was asking for his money back because he was an emancipated 
child, in the instant case the appellant is claiming that his child 
is emancipated, thus there is no need for him to support the child. 
The power to emancipate a minor resides in the parents who 
have a duty to support the child. The parents intentions control, 
Frevig v. Frevig, 90 New Mexico 51, 559 P.2d 839 (1977). The inten-
tions of the parents may be implied from the conduct of the parents and 
the surrounding circumstances. In re Marriage of Weisbart, Colorado 
564 P.2d 961 (1977). 
In the case of Frevig v. Frevig, supra, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court held: 
"An express emancipation of a minor takes place 
when a parent freely and voluntarily agrees with 
his child, who is able to care and provide for 
himself, that he may leave home, earn his own 
living, and do as he pleases within his earnings." 
In the instant case, John David Attebury, was free to do 
as he wished. Neither parent placed any restrictions upon him. He 
was able to care and provide for himself and the record is replete 
with evidence of this proposition. This is proven by the fact that 
-12-
-~;;:;;::::==----------- ---rl-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he was employed in Twin Falls, Idaho, and in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
on a full time basis. 
This court should find John David Attebury emancipated 
as of October 1977, the time he began living and earning his own 
living, and the he is not entitled to su~port from defendant. 
POINT IV 
JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY &.~D JOHN JOSEPH ATTEBURY ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM APPELLANT SINCE MAY 8, 1979 
BECAUSE OF BEING SUPPORTED BY THEIR STEPFATHER 
In 1979 the Utah Legislature amended Utah's laws concerning 
support. They enacted section 78-45-4.1 and 78-45-4.2 of the Code. 
78-45-4.1 provides: 
"A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the 
same extent that a natural or adoptive parent 
is required to support a child. Provided, how-
ever, that upon termination of the marriage or 
common law relationship between the stepparent 
and the child's natural or adoptive parent or 
in cases where there is a filed pending divorce 
action with separation or a legal separation 
between the stepparent and the child's natural 
parent, the support obligation shall be as if 
the marriage had never taken place." 
The statute seems to clearly state the the stepparent, 
during the marriage, is the one responsible for the support of his 
stepchildren. The duty of support of the natural parent only comes 
back into active existence if there is a divorce or a separation 
with a filed divorce pending between the stepparent and the natural 
parent. The stepfather in the instant case has provided support 
for his stepchildren. He has provided with a trailer home to live 
in, a motor vehicle, as well as other necessities. The stepfather 
... 
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by these actions, has relieved the natural father of any active duty 
to support his children. 
78-45-4.2 provides: 
"Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve 
the natural parent of adoptive parent of the 
primary obligation of support, furthermore, a 
stepparent has the same right to recover support 
for a stepchild from the natural or adoptive 
parent as any other obligee." 
This section does not relieve the stepfather of the active duty to 
support his stepchildren. It also does not require the natural parent 
to pay support to the child if the stepfather is doing so, but it 
does require the natural father to pay support for his children if therd 
is a need for it. 
These sections of the Utah Code Annotated are very vague 
and unclear as to their meaning and purpose. Since they are subject 
to many interpretations there is a need for judicial review of them to ·· 
guide both the bench and the bar. 
Since the stepfather is still married to the mother at the 
time of these proceedings, the natural father should be relieved of 
any active duty to support his children until there is a need for him 
to do so. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO PAY FOR ARREARAGES FOR 
EITHER JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY OR JOHN JOSEPH ATTEBURY BE-
CAUSE THE COURT ORDER OF MAY 31, 1979 IS RES JUDICATA 
AS TO THESE SUMS 
The URESA grants to the Utah courts the jurisdiction over 
the issue of arrearages. In Wyoming Statutes 20-113, 1957 as amended 
1973 Cum. Supplement it states: 
-14-
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"All duties of support, including the duty to pay 
arrearage~ are enforceable by a proceeding under 
this act." 
The URESA also gives Utah the duty of applying its laws 
to all matters concerning support under this Act by its choice of 
law section (Wyoming Statutes 20-111, 1957, as amended, 1973 Cum. 
Supplement). Therefore, we must look at Utah law to decide the issue 
of res judicata. 
Res judicata is a doctrine by which a final judgment of a 
court of competitive jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in 
all subsequent litigation, involving the same cause of action. This 
is to avoid duplication and the possibility of subjecting a party to 
multiple law suits that could result in an unjust result. 
The case of East Millcreek Water Comoanv v. Salt Lake City, 
108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945) is dispositive on this issue. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
" . . . there are two kinds of cases where 
res judicata is applied: In the one the 
former action is an absolute bar to the 
maintenance of the second; it usually bars 
the successful party as well as the loser, 
it must be between the same parties or their 
privies, it applies not only to points and 
issues which are actually raised and decided 
herein, but also to such as could have been 
therein adjudicated, but it only applies to 
where to claim, demand or cause of action is 
the same in both cases." 
-15-
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further it states: 
" . if one of the parties fails to raise 
any point or issue or to litigate any part of 
his claim, demand or cause of action and the 
matter goes to final judgment, such party 
may not again litigate that claim, demand or 
cause of action or any issue, point or part 
thereof which he could have but failed to 
litigate in the former action." East Millcreek 
Water Company v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315 
159 P.2d 863 at 866 (1947) 
In the instant case there was a 0ourt ~rder dated May 31, 
1979 in which the same parties to the August 22, 1979 order were 
involved. This court order referred to future support for the 
children and no reference was made to past support. Both sides had 
an opportunity to be heard. If we follow the holding of East Millcreek 
Water Company v. Salt Lake City, supra, the respondent is unable to 
claim any past support. The doctrine of res judicata, by the holding 
of this case, can be applied to all points and issues that could have 
been therein adjudicated. Respondent was able to have the issue of 
arrearages adjudicated at the May 31, 1979 hearing if she desired, but 
failed to press the issue. The issue of arrearages was present at the 
May 31st hearing, some past support was due at that time. 
Therefore, since this was a subsequent claim the arrearages 
at the August 22nd hearing, before a court of competent jurisdiction, 
between the same parties which involved the same cause of action for 
support and the respondent had an opportunity to adjudicate the issue 
of arrearages if she desired, but she did not do so, this claim for 
past support can't be upheld because the matter is res judicata. 
-16-
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to relief from all orders of 
support based on this record. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wendell P. Ables 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
Suite 14, Intrade Building 
1399 South Seventh East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 1980, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief, postage 
prepaid, to Sandra H. Peuler, Deputy County Attorney, attorney for 
plaintiff, 243 East 400 South, Lower Level, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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